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NOTES
Antitrust and Bank Mergers: United States v.
Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Co.
Two small banks, Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust Co. (PNB)
and Second National Bank of Phillipsburg (SNB), both located in Phillipsburg, New Jersey, sought to merge. The city of Phillipsburg was
considered part of "one town," the metropolitan area of Phillipsburg and
Easton, Pennsylvania. The two cities and their suburbs had a combined
population of approximately 90,000, with seven commercial banks, four
in Easton and three in Phillipsburg. PNB and SNB were respectively the
third and fifth largest in overall banking business in "one town." They
were direct competitors, oriented towards the needs of small depositors
and borrowers. Both banks primarily served Phillipsburg residents. The
merger would produce a bank second in size of the remaining six commercial banks in "one town."' Phillipsburg-Easton was located in Lehigh
Valley, an area of approximately 1,000 square miles with a population
of about 500,000 and a total of 38 banks. There was considerable mobility
among the residents of the Lehigh Valley area for social, shopping, and
employment purposes. As required by the Bank Merger Act,' independent
reports on the competitive factors of the proposed merger were obtained
from the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Attorney General. All three said that the merger would
have a harmful effect upon commercial banking competition in Phillipsburg-Easton. The Comptroller of Currency nevertheless approved the
proposed merger, finding that the agencies had defined the product and
geographic markets too narrowly. The district court upheld the proposed
merger, saying that there would be minimal anticompetitive effect and,
further, that any reduction in competition would be clearly outweighed
by public interest.' The Government appealed.4 Held, reversed and remanded: The relevant product is commercial banking-without consideration of competition from other sources; the relevant geographic market
is Phillipsburg-Easton, and the "convenience and needs" of the community must be evaluated in the relevant geographic market. United States v.
PhillipsburgNational Bank Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
I.

SECTION

7

OF THE CLAYTON ACT

Beginning in 1890 with the passage of the Sherman Act,5 Congress has
consistently indicated that market competition must be maintained and
I The resulting bank in the "one town" area would have 19.3% of total assets, 23.4% of total
deposits, 19.2% of total demand deposits, and 27.3% of total loans.
2 12 U.S.C. S 1828(c) (4) (Supp. III, 1968).
a United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J. 1969).
4
This was a direct appeal under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1965). Probable jurisdiction was noted at 397 U.S. 933 (1970).
5
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 5§1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1965)).
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has thus imposed restrictions on business activity through antitrust legislation. Under section 2 of the Sherman Act,' as construed by the Supreme
Court, large firm size has not been considered illegal per se, but rather
has been judged by the "rule of reason."' This rule first stresses the existence of an undue concentration of market power, and secondly the existence of predatory acts or illegal motives underlying the acquisition and
the deployment of that power. The "rule of reason," or the Sherman Act
standard, has been interpreted to mean that the acquisition of competitors
may be allowed if the court finds that the competitive restraint thus created is not "unreasonable."'
The Clayton Act,' enacted in 1914, was designed to supplement the
Sherman Act.1" Mergers had been typically accomplished by acquisition
of the corporate stock of competitor firms. In an effort to limit this widely
used method of restricting competition, and thus to halt the formation
of monopolistic power at its inception, Congress included section 7 of
the Clayton Act. Section 7 prohibited any acquisition of stock which
substantially restrained competition between corporations involved in a
merger. However, it became evident that anticompetitive mergers could
still be accomplished by asset acquisition.'" Also, early Supreme Court
decisions tended to apply to alleged section 7 violations the "rule of reason"
test used for Sherman Act violations," thereby approving mergers which
were not "unreasonable" restraints of trade."
In an attempt to provide effective antimerger legislation, section 7 was
amended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Act. 4 The amended section 7
prohibited the acquisition of stock or assets "where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition ...
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."" The clause banning asset acquisitions extended to all corporations
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission."
The first Supreme Court interpretation of the Celler-Kefauver Act was
' Section 2 of the Sherman Act is directed to unlawful monopolization of trade: "[E]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1965).
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
SSee United Statesv. Columbia SteelCo., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), in which the Court permitted
Columbia Steel Co., a subsidiary of the recognized price leader, United States Steel Corp., to acquire
an important competitor on the ground that the acquisition did not impose an "unreasonable restraint" of trade. By its decision, the Court indicated that it still adheres to the "rule of reason"
(the Sherman Act test) for judging mergers. See alsoV. MUND, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 133,
1349 (4th ed. 1965).
Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §§ 2-26, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-24, 44
(1964)).
1Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355 (1922).
1iV. MUND, supra note 8, at 144. And see Arrow-Hart & Hegerman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291
U.S. 587 (1934); Swift & Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
12See notes 7, 8 supra, and accompanying text.
"See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); United Statesv. Republic Steel
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
14Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 5§7, 11, 64 Stat.1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1965)).
15Id.
16Id.; see note 30 infra.
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Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,"7 decided in 1962. The Court stated that
the primary consideration in adopting the amendment was "a fear of what
was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.""5 The Court rejected Sherman Act standards as inappropriate for application to section 7 cases.'" Thus, any merger having sub-

stantial anticompetitive effects in an "economically significant market"'"
would be invalid. To determine what was an "economically significant
market" the Court defined the "product market"21 and the "geographic
market."" The product market was to be determined by the "reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the

product itself and substitutes for it,"' while the geographic market selected for testing must both "correspond to the commercial realities of the
industry and be economically significant."' The Court concluded that
the market share which the merged company may control is one of the
major factors of anticompetitiveness.' The Court also emphasized that it
is necessary to examine market shares against the setting of a particular

market. The Court looked particularly at market structure features: the
number of firms, product characteristics, conditions of entry, and the
degree of concentration. Brown Shoe thus appeared to define the principal
criterion for assessing a merger as its "qualitative substantiality" (its
" 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
'Id. at 315.
'9The amended § 7, declared the Court, was intended to reach incipient monopolies and trade
restraints outside the scope of the Sherman Act. Id. at 317, 318. See notes 7, 8 supra, and accompanying text.
20 370 U.S. at 335. "The 1950 amendments made plain Congress' intent that the validity of
[mergers] was to be gauged on a broader scale [than that used prior to 1950]: their effect on
competition generally in an economically significant market." Id. The concept of an "economically
significant market" encompasses both product and geographical considerations. Section 7 of the
Clayton Act forbids acquisition by a corporation of the stock or assets of another corporation where
such acquisition may substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly "in any line of
commerce" and "in any section of the country." See note 15 supra, and accompanying text. "Line
of commerce" is denominated by the product market, and "section of the country" is denominated
by the geographic market. The Senate Report on the 1950 amendment to § 7 stated:
What constitutes a section [of the country] will vary with the nature of the product.
Owing to the differences in the size and character of markets, it would be meaningless,
from an economic point of view, to attempt to apply for all products a uniform definition of section [of the country], whether such definition were based on miles,
population, income, or any other unit of measurement. A section which would be
economically significant for a heavy, durable product, such as large machine tools,
might well be meaningless for a light product, such as milk.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 5-6 (1950), reprinted in U.S. CoDE CONG. SERv. 4293,
4297-98 (1950).
2tSee note 20 supra.
22Id.

23370 U.S. at 325.
24Id. at 336-37. Mergers between companies standing in a customer-supplier relationship are
characterized as "vertical" mergers, while mergers between companies performing similar functions
in the production or sale of comparable goods or services are characterized as "horizontal" mergers.
The Court distinguished between the horizontal and vertical aspects of the proposed merger in
Brown Shoe. As to the geographic market for the vertical aspects of the merger, the Court held
that the "relationships of product value, bulk, weight and consumer demand" made shoe manufacturing a nationwide market. Id. at 328. As to the horizontal aspects, the Court stated that while
the geographic market may encompass the entire nation in some cases, in others it may be as small
as a single metropolitan area of 10,000 population. Id. at 337. See note 20 supra, and accompanying
text.
2370 U.S. at 343.
2"Id. at 321-22. The Court stated that a merger must "be functionally viewed, in the context
of its particular industry." Id.
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overall impact on competition in the particular industry), rather than its
"quantitative substantiality" (the size and market share of the resulting
post-merger corporation)." One year later, however, United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank"' placed this interpretation in doubt.
II.

APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST TO BANK MERGERS

Prior to the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act, bank mergers had been exempt
from section 7 of the Clayton Act." After the 1950 amendment to section
7, bank mergers were still generally thought to be exempt, because banks
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission"
and bank mergers were generally not accomplished through stock acquisitions."
The period between 1950 and 1960 was one which the Supreme Court
described as "having witnessed a definite trend towards concentration""
in commercial banking. To combat this trend, and to reconcile policies
of state and federal regulation of banking with policies for the maintenance of competition in banking, Congress passed the 1960 Bank Merger
Act." Theoretically, the Act sought to achieve a balance between competitive and banking factors. The Act delegated responsibility for the
administrative approval of bank mergers to three federal agencies,' which
were directed to evaluate banking factors, including: (1) financial history
and condition of the bank involved, (2) adequacy of its capital structure,
(3) general character of its management, (4) the convenience and needs
of the community to be served, and (5) whether its corporate powers
were consistent with the purposes of the Act. Alternatively, the three
agencies were to consider possible anticompetitive effects. The merger
could be approved only if after considering all these factors, the appropriate agency found the transaction "to be in the public interest."' Thus,
in theory, although the Act was designed to prevent unduly anticompetitive bank mergers, if the agencies determined that the banking factors
"A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 185 (2d ed. 1970).
28374 U.S. 321 (1963).

21 See 1966 Amendment to the Bank Merger Act: Economic Perspective and Legal Analysis, 20
VAND. L. REV. 200, 212 (1966).
20 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (b) (1965).

Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in part that no cor-

poration subject to the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the assets of another corporation
where the effect would be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1965). This would seem to indicate that banks could acquire the assets of other
banks without being subject to 5 7.
" See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 378 (1963) (dissenting opinion),
citing S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1959). If bank mergers are not accomplished
by stock acquisition, then they are accomplished by asset acquisition, and are thus seemingly exempt from § 7. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
" United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 325 (1963).
"Act of May 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1828(c)
(1965)).
" The 1960 Act provided that the regulatory agency to approve bank mergers is the Comptroller of Currency when the resulting bank is a national bank; the Federal Reserve Board, when
the resulting bank is a state-chartered member of the Federal Reserve System; and the FDIC, when
the resulting bank is a non-member of the Federal Reserve System and is insured by the FDIC.
Id. These same provisions are found in the 1966 Act. See note 42 infra.
"12 U.S.C. § 1825(c)(2) (1965).
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outweighed the anticompetitive effects, an anticompetitive merger could
be approved in the "public interest."'6
It was not long, however, before the Supreme Court rejected this theory.
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank," decided in 1963, the
Court refused to accept the contention that the Comptroller's approval
under the 1960 Bank Merger Act immunized bank mergers from scrutiny
under the Clayton Act. The Court held not only that section 7 of the
Clayton Act was applicable to bank mergers, but that bank mergers were
to be judged only by competitive factors." Thus, the banking factors
applied by the regulatory agencies under the 1960 Act were not considered
by the Court. The relevant product market was "the cluster of products
...and services ...denoted by the term 'commercial banking.'"" The
relevant geographic area "must be charted by careful selection of the
market area in which the seller operates, and to which the buyer can practi."' Since PhiladelphiaBank made competition
cably turn for supplies ....
the only criterion of legality for bank mergers, the validity of the Bank
Merger Act of 1960 was placed in doubt.
To resolve the uncertainty Congress passed the Bank Merger Act of
1966," which adopted a standard of "convenience and needs." Under the
standard the merger might be approved if it served the convenience and
needs of the community, and if such benefit clearly outweighed the merger's anticompetitive effects. Thus, Congress was willing to allow certain
mergers even if they reduced competition.
United States v. FirstCity NationalBane provided the first opportunity
for the Supreme Court to test a proposed merger under the 1966 Act.
In an opinion seemingly reaffirming PhiladelphiaBank, the anticompetitive
effect of a bank merger was held to be actionable under the existing anti" S.REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-23 (1959).
37 3 7 4 U.S. 321 (1963).
competition' isnot
a'Id. at 371. "A merger the effect
of which 'may be substantially to lessen
it may be
saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of socialor economic debits and credits,
deemed beneficial . . . . Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It
therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and malignant alike .... " Id. Subsequent
to Philadelphia Bank, the Court held that a merger which eliminated significant competition between banks constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of S 1 of the Sherman Act.
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
" Id. at 356. See note 20 supra, and accompanying text.
40374 U.S. at 359, quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961);
see note 20 supra, and accompanying text.
"'Act of Feb. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified at 12 U.S.C. S 1828(c)
(Supp. II, 1967)). The Act provides in part:
The responsible agency shall not approve: (A) any proposed merger transaction which
would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination
or conspiracy to monopolize or attempt to monopolize [business] . . . (B) any other
proposed merger transaction whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition . . . unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of

the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable
effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to
be served. In every case, the responsible agency shall take into consideration the
financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed
institutions,
and the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
Id. 5 1828 (c)(5) (emphasis added). Under the 1966 Act, "competitive factor" reports must be
obtained from the Attorney General as well as the banking regulatory agencies (id. S 1828 (c) (4)).
As to the appropriate agency to give approval, see note 34 supra.
42386 U.S. 361 (1967).
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trust laws.' Additionally, the 1966 Act was held not to have changed
the standards for application of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Court
stated, however, that the Act provided a new defense, i.e., "convenience
and needs." First, a trial court must determine the anticompetitive effects
of the proposed merger, judged by antitrust standards. Second, if the
merger is found to be anticompetitive, a court must determine whether
the public interest (convenience and needs of the community) outweighs
the anticompetitive effects. In United States v. Third National Bank"
the Court restricted the "convenience and needs" test by conditioning
merger approval upon a finding of the unavailability of alternative solutions to the problems of the smaller or weaker bank.
Thus, after a long battle over application vel non of section 7 to bank
mergers, a compromise emerged. Section 7 was to be applied to bank
mergers, but mergers could still be approved if the "convenience and
needs of the community" outweighed the anticompetitive effects, and if
no suitable alternative to merger was shown. It was against this background
that Phillipsburg appeared.
III. UNITED STATES V. PHILLIPSBURG NATIONAL BANK & TRUST Co.
Some critics of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
antitrust cases have complained that the Court has used a simplistic, "big

is bad" rationale. ' After the decision in United States v. Phillipsburg
National Bank & Trust Co.," however, it cannot be said that the Court
looks upon smallness as a virtue. In Phillipsburg the Court found that
"[m]ergers of directly competing small commercial banks in small communities, no less than those of large banks in large communities, are subject to scrutiny under these [same antitrust] standards.'""
The Court, in judging the proposed merger between two small banks
whose combined assets were approximately $41 million, applied the
standards developed in large bank merger cases. Relying chiefly on Philadelphia Bank, in which the assets of the resulting bank would have totaled
almost $2 billion," the Court reasoned that the localization of business
typical of the banking industry is particularly pronounced when small
customers are involved."' Because of this pronounced localization, the relevant geographic area became Phillipsburg-Easton.0
4' Therefore, a suit alleging anticompetitiveness did not have to be brought under the Bank
Merger Act, but could be brought under the Sherman or Clayton Acts. Id.
44390 U.S. 171 (1968).
' In a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Harlan stated that "the Court's opinion amounts to an
invocation of antitrust numerology and a presumption that in the antitrust field good things come
usually, if not always, in small packages." United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376
U.S. 665, 673-80 (1964). He then argued that the majority found no fault except bigness. Id.
at 676.
46399 U.S. 350
47Id. at 358.

(1970).

"' The resulting bank after the merger would have had assets of $1,805.3 million. United States
v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 373 n.1 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
49 The Court stated that "[s]mall depositors have little reason to deal with a bank other than
the one most geographically convenient to them. For such persons, geographical convenience can be
a more powerful influence than the availability of a higher rate of interest and a more distant,
though still nearby, bank." 399 U.S. at 363-64.
s0The Supreme Court reasoned that Phillipsburg-Easton was the relevant geographic area be-
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Regarding the relevant product market, the district court's opinion was
that a distinction should be drawn between products and services involving
significant anticompetitive effects and those involving widespread competition from other sources."5 The Supreme Court agreed that the relevant
product market is determined by the nature of the commercial entities
involved and by the nature of the competition which they face. However,
submarkets are not a basis for disregard of a broader line of commercecommercial banking-that has economic significance. The Court concluded
that the cluster of products and services denoted by the term "commercial banking" has economic significance well beyond the various products
and services involved, and commercial banking is, therefore, the relevant
product.'
The Court then directed its attention to the anticompetitive effects of
the merger. Emphasizing that a merger must be judged by its tendency
to spawn a firm that controls "an undue percentage share" of the relevant
market and to cause a "significant increase in the concentration of firms in
that market, 2' 3 the Court concluded that the merger would be anticompetitive. Therefore, the merger would, absent the Bank Merger Act, violate
section 7 of the Clayton Act. To reach this conclusion, the Court calculated
the percentage share of the relevant market that the merged bank would
hold, and the resulting changes in market "concentration," as measured
by the percentage of the total banking market that would be held cumulatively by the two largest and three largest banks. Perhaps in an attempt
to alleviate the burdensome complexity of the determination of anticompetitive effects in antitrust bank merger cases, the Court has imposed a
rigid structural test based on percentage market shares which would be
held by the merged bank, and the other two largest banks in the area."
cause (1) the relevant geographic area is defined by the market area "to which the purchaser can
practicably turn for supplies" [see note 40 supra, and accompanying text], and (2) the localization
of the banking business made the banking customers in Phillipsburg and Easton do substantially all
their banking in those towns. The district court had emphasized the mobility of the residents of
the Lehigh Valley and had defined the relevant geographic area as approximately four times the
area of Phillipsburg-Easton with a 1960 population of 216,000 and a total of 18 banks. 306 F.
Supp. at 652-53, 656-58. The appellee banks argued before the Supreme Court that PhillipsburgEaston is not an "economically significant" market. The Court held that Phillipsburg-Easton was
"economically significant," relying on Brown Shoe. 399 U.S. at 360. See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
31 306 F. Supp. at 650-51. The district court had defined the relevant product market to include competition from other financial institutions such as savings and loan associations and pension
funds. The lower court stressed the difference between the large banks in Philadelphia Bank and
the small banks involved in Phillipsburg. The court expressed its view that "[i]n terms of function
the defendant banks are more comparable to savings institutions than to large commercial banks."
Id. at 648.
sa See note 39 supra, and accompanying text. The Court declared that "[i] f commercial banking
were rejected as the line of commerce for banks with the same or similar ratios of business as those
of the appellee banks, the effect would likely be to deny customers of small banks-and thus residents of many small towns-the antitrust protection to which they are no less entitled than customers of large city banks." 399 U.S. at 361-62.
53 399 U.S. at 366.
"' The dissent in Phillipsburg strongly criticized the majority's application of these figures as
a "simplistic" exercise of "antitrust numerology." Id. at 376. The dissent declared that "[b]y
treating these percentages as no different from those found in Philadelphia Bank the Court blithely
assumes that percentages of the same order of magnitude represent the same degree of market
power, irrespective of the amount of competition from neighboring markets." Id. at 381. To
effectively evaluate the anticompetitive effects of a bank merger, stated the dissent, the Court
should instead consider the significance of the available figures, rather than just their magnitude. The
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The Court also apparently reduced significantly the magnitude of the
percentages which constitute an "undue share of the market" and an undue
increase in "market concentration.""
The Court concluded its opinion by holding that the area in which
"convenience and needs" must be evaluated under the 1966 Bank Merger
Act is the relevant geographic area. The Court reasoned that the community to be served is, because of commercial realities, virtually always
as large as or larger than the geographic market. Thus, evaluation of "convenience and needs" in an area smaller than the geographic market could
result in approval of a merger which has overall anticompetitive effects
when viewed throughout the relevant market, and has countervailing
beneficial effects only in a segment of the market." By expressly confining
the consideration of "convenience and needs" to the relevant geographic
area, the Court precluded its consideration in a smaller or larger area.
This would seem to prevent the justification of a merger under the "convenience and needs" standard on the ground that the merged bank would
be better able to compete in a national or regional market-thereby rendering those markets more competitive. Thus, the Court holds that the positive
community benefits in a submarket may not be used to justify or counterbalance anticompetitive effects in other parts of the relevant market,
and implies that the positive effects in a larger market (regional or national) may not be used to justify or counterbalance the negative effects
in another market (relevant geographic area)."
IV. CONCLUSION

Phillipsburghas importance because it defines the market area in which
to evaluate "convenience and needs." ' Possibly the most important aspect
of the Court's holding, that the "convenience and needs" must be evaluated in the relevant geographic area, is the implied preclusion of a justification of anticompetitive effects by resort to the consideration of a
Court should consider aspects of market structure, such as the interrelationship between the
determination of market shares and the definition of the product market. Id. at 373-82.
5 See note 54 supra, and accompanying text. As to the magnitude of the percentages, the figures
in Phillipsburg were, on the whole, smaller than those in previous cases. For example, the percentages of total assets in the relevant market held by the merged banks were: in Philadelphia
Bank, "at least 30%"; in Nashville Bank, 38.4%; and in Phillipsburg, 19.3%. The percentages of
assets in the relevant market held by the two largest banks (after the proposed merger) were: in
Philadelphia Bank, 59%; in Nashville Bank, 77%; and in Phillipsburg, 55%. The percentages for
the three largest banks after the proposed merger were Nashville Bank, 98%, and Phillipsburg,
68%. Because Philadelphia Bank involved a merger between the second and third largest banks, the
percentage held by the three largest banks was not used in that case. See 399 U.S. at 376 ri.8.
S See notes 42-44 supra, and accompanying text.
67 Therefore, the district court, to approve
a merger, must determine that the merger would
probably benefit all customers of banking services in the market, rather than merely a small minority of the customers such as those interested mainly in large loan and trust services, or possibly the customers in only one community of a multi-community relevant geographic area. 399
U.S. at 372.
"8The Court in PhiladelphiaBank, rejected the argument that a merger can be justified, under
the "convenience and needs" standard, on the ground that the resulting bank will be better able
to compete in a national or regional market and might render these markets more competitive, and
that the area needs a larger bank in order to attract business and stimulate economic development.
374 U.S. at 371. However, this decision was before the passage of the 1966 Bank Merger Act,
which adopted the "convenience and needs" standard. See note 42 supra, and accompanying text.
10 See notes 42, 43 supra, and accompanying text.
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merger's effect on a regional or national market. Perhaps the major
significance of Phillipsburg, however, is that it applies the same standards
developed in large bank merger cases to small bank mergers. It applies
the same standards for defining the relevant geographic and product markets and evaluates anticompetitive effects in the same manner for small
as for large banks. It also apparently reduces significantly the percentages
of market shares which establish anticompetitiveness. "°
The Court's conclusion concerning the relevant geographic area is based
upon an appreciation of the economic aspects of the market structure. The
Court, however, does not seem to express consistently this appreciation in
considering other aspects of the case. The major thrust of the decision is
in the direction of applying standards developed in antitrust cases dealing
with large banks to cases involving small banks. What is forbidden to the
Goliaths of banking is equally forbidden to the Davids. The Phillipsburg
decision seems to place in doubt the legality of every merger of two directly competing banks, no matter how small.61
Phillipsburg seems equitable as long as it is assumed that small banks
are only miniature versions of their larger brothers. The outcome of a
bank merger case is vitally affected by defining "commercial banking"
as the relevant product. While this definition may be adequate for large
commercial banks, it may not be adequate for small local banks, which are
part of a different market structure." Further, the Court does not give
adequate consideration to economic factors in judging anticompetitiveness.
Possibly in an attempt to provide simple rules for judging merger cases,
the Court has perhaps been guilty of oversimplification, establishing apparently minimum percentage market shares of commercial banking which
automatically establish anticompetitiveness. The fixed percentages should
be regarded only as guidelines. Flexibility should be the rule, and the percentage should be computed after an economic analysis which properly
defines the areas in which they are to be computed.' In short, relevant and
important economic data which place any merger in a particular market
structure should be considered. Fixed percentages should not be inflexible

minimums, but should comply with the economic realities of the industry
to which they are applied.
Darrel A. Rice
60See note 55 supra, and accompanying text.
" The author of the dissent in Phillipsburg stated that "[m]y first reaction to this case . . . was
wonderment that the Department of Justice had bothered to sue . . . . With tigers still at large
in our competitive jungle, why should the Department be taking aim at such small game?" 399
U.S. at 373-74.
6 As the district court and dissent in Phillipsburg emphasize, the relevant product is not necessarily the same for small banks and large banks. Since the determination of both anticompetitiveness
and "convenience and needs" depends upon the definition of the relevant market, which in turn
depends upon the definition of the relevant product, the economic aspects of the market structure
are vitally important to judging the validity of bank mergers.
"' Although there is, as the Court stated in Brown Shoe, a "need for limiting the mass of possible
relevant evidence in [antitrust] cases . . . in order to avoid confusion and its concomitant increased
possibility of error," Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 341 n.68 (1963), there is
also a need, in judging Clayton Act violations, to avoid inflexible and arbitrary standards based on
a few percentage figures. Only an examination of the structure, history, and probable future of
the particular market can provide the appropriate setting for judging the anticompetitive effects
of a merger.

